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Do Stock Markets Discipline US Bank Holding Companies:
Just Monitoring, or also Inuencing?
Abstract
This paper presents evidence that bank managers adjust key strategic variables following a risk and/or
valuation signal from the stock market. Banks receive a risk signal when they exhibit substantially higher
(semi-)volatility compared to the best performing bank(s) with similar characteristics, and a valuation signal
when they are undervalued relative to the average bank with similar characteristics. We document, using a
partial adjustment model, that bank managers adjust the long-term target value of key strategic variables
and the speed of adjustment towards those targets following a risk and/or negative valuation signal. We
interpret this as evidence of stock market inuencing. We show that our results are unlikely to be driven by
indirect inuencing by regulators, subordinated debtholders, retail or wholesale depositors. Finally, we show
that the likelihood that banks receive a risk and/or valuation signal increases with opaqueness, managerial
discretion and specialization.
Keywords: market discipline; inuencing; partial adjustment; opaqueness; bank risk
JEL: G21, G28, L25
1 Introduction
It is generally assumed that bank managers are disciplined by internal governance mechanisms and by their
supervisors. Whether or not banks are also disciplined by nancial markets is less clear. Yet, the Basel
capital adequacy rules, one of the cornerstones of modern bank regulation, mention market discipline as a
separate third pillar (next to capital ratios and supervisory interventions). Relatedly, stress testing exercises
have expanded the disclosure requirements of banks, with the explicit objective to foster market discipline.
In this paper we revisit this issue by focusing on the stock market as a potential source of market discipline
on banks. The crucial question is: Can the stock market assess bank risk and inuence bank behavior?
Bliss and Flannery (2002) distinguish two components of market discipline: market monitoring and
market inuencing. They dene market monitoring as the ability of securityholders to accurately assess the
condition of the rm, and inuencing as subsequent managerial actions in response to these assessments.
While there is considerable evidence of market monitoring (see e.g. Flannery and Sorescu (1996), Saunders,
Strock, and Travlos (1990) and Morgan and Stiroh (2001)), research examining the market inuencing
channel is more scarce and generally inconclusive. Bliss and Flannery (2002) fail to nd evidence that
bank stockholders or bondholders e¤ectively inuence bank indicators controlled by bank managers, such
as the leverage position of the BHC, factors a¤ecting bank asset risk, changes in the number of employees
and the amount of uninsured liabilities. Gendreau and Humphrey (1980) nd that banks are penalized for
higher leverage by a higher cost of debt and equity, but nd no evidence that these relative cost changes
induce bank managers to alter their leverage position relative to other banks. Ashcraft (2008) shows that
the proportion of subordinated debt in total regulatory capital a¤ects the probability of failure and future
distress, suggesting that bank debtholders are able to signicantly inuence the behavior of distressed banks.
Schaeck, Cihak, Maechler, and Stolz (2012) nd evidence for debtholder discipline in a sample of small and
medium-sized commercial banks in the US over the period 1990-2007: Bank managers are more likely to be
removed if the bank is nancially weak and this e¤ect is stronger for banks subject to discipline exerted by
large debtholders. The authors nd no conclusive evidence of discipline exerted by shareholders or depositors,
nor that forced turnovers consistently improve bank performance (even at windows of three years after the
turnover). Hence, current empirical research predominantly supports the view that market discipline is, at
best, a relatively weak disciplining device.
The main contribution of this paper is the design of a new test for direct market inuencing. Our
procedure starts by identifying stock market-based risk and (negative) valuation signals at the individual
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bank level. Consequently, we test to what extent bank managers adjust key strategic variables following a
(combination of a) risk and negative valuation signal. Using a partial adjustment model, we test both for a
change in the long-term target value of the strategic variable, as well as in the speed of adjustment towards
that long-term target value. This partial adjustment model has been used quite often to model various rm
characteristics, for example by Flannery and Rangan (2006) and Flannery and Rangan (2008) for leverage,
Lintner (1956) for dividend payout ratios and Fama and French (2000), Raymar (1991) and Sarkar and
Zapatero (2003) for earnings.
An important innovation is the way we dene the risk and valuation signals. We model our risk measure,
equity return semi-volatility (SV, henceforth), measured over one quarter of daily data, along a stochastic
frontier. The stochastic frontier describes the level of risk that the best performing banks with similar
characteristics can attain. We call a bank ine¢ cient from a risk perspective when it is situated above the
risk frontier, i.e. when it has more risk than its best performing peers. A bank will receive a risk signal
at time t if its ine¢ ciency score at that time is situated among the 10 percent worst ine¢ ciency scores of
all banks over the preceding four years and is hence substantially above the risk frontier. We use a similar
approach for our valuation measure, the market-to-book (MTB) ratio, only here we allow banks to be either
under- or overvalued relative to the average bank with similar characteristics. We say that a bank receives a
negative valuation signal when its quarterly valuation score belongs to the 10 percent largest undervaluations
(of all banks, over the preceding four years). Looking at large signals relative to the best performing peer
is crucial. As market prices are forward looking, they reect information on rmsfundamentals, but also
on expected corrective actions. If investors expect a corrective action, the resulting signal will be smaller
(Bond, Goldstein, and Prescott (2010)). Using the most extreme signals makes it less likely that we look at
events where investors have strong expectations on corrective behavior. Nevertheless, the results are robust
(but unreported) when using the 25 percent worst ine¢ ciency or valuation scores as signals.
The main result of this paper is that we nd substantial evidence in favor of the direct market inuencing
hypothesis. We show that banks that receive a risk signal react by increasing their long-term target capital
bu¤er and by decreasing their liquidity risk. Banks that receive a negative valuation signal react by increasing
their target prot level, primarily by lowering the cost-to-income ratio. This suggests that managers trying
to improve the market assessment of their banks value attempt this mainly by improving cost e¢ ciency.
Apart from adjusting their long-term target ratios, we also nd banks to more quickly bridge the gap between
the current and target rate following a market signal. These adjustments are in line with expectations and
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with the objectives of supervisors.
Furthermore, we investigate whether or not our ndings can be interpreted as evidence of direct inu-
encing rather than indirect inuencing. Indirect market discipline means that the change in bank behavior
is enforced by other stakeholders (e.g. supervisors) than the stakeholder (shareholders in our case) exerting
the monitoring e¤ort. First, we argue that the number of Prompt Corrective Actions (PCAs) is so small
that our signals are unlikely to be proxies for regulatory interventions. Second, our results do not appear
to be driven by inuencing from subordinated debtholders, as we nd that our inuencing results are most
pronounced for those banks that do not have subordinated debt. Third, we test whether or not our results
are potentially driven by inuencing exercised by retail or wholesale deposit holders. We do observe that
the share of retail funding in total funding is larger for banks receiving a risk signal. This is mainly due to
increasing the core deposits, and we do not nd evidence that it is more likely for a bank to lose wholesale
funding following a risk signal. Nevertheless, as in most other studies addressing this issue, there is still
a need for caution since other sources of discipline, such as unobserved actions taken by the supervisory
authorities, may a¤ect bank behavior. Finally, we investigate in more detail which characteristics make it
more likely that a bank will receive a risk or valuation signal. We consider the variance of the signal to be
the scope for pressure from stock market investors. Therefore, in an extension of our setup, we allow the
variance of the residuals to vary through time and change with bank characteristics. We nd that stock
market investors punish discretionary accounting behavior and that the degree of bank opacity has a positive
e¤ect on the variance of the residuals (and hence the likelihood of observing market signals).
The remainder of this paper is structured as follows. Section 2 introduces a new setup to assess the
di¤erent components of market discipline, i.e. market monitoring and inuencing, in a unied framework.
The rst part discusses the stochastic frontier model for Semi-Volatility and the linear regression model for
the Market-to-Book ratio. Next, we show how to extract risk and valuation signals from both models. The
nal section presents the partial adjustment model that we use to empirically test for market inuencing.
Section 3 contains the main empirical ndings for the inuencing hypothesis. In Section 4, we show that the
results are evidence of direct inuencing following stock market signals, rather than indirect inuencing via
regulators or wholesale nanciers. In Section 5 we analyze which banks are more likely to get signals. A
nal section concludes.
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2 A New Setup to Test Market Discipline
2.1 Monitoring by Equityholders
Bliss and Flannery (2002) dene market monitoring as the ability of securityholders to accurately assess
the condition of the rm. Previous papers have tested the market monitoring hypothesis by relating bank
risk and valuation to bank-specic characteristics in a linear regression framework (see e.g. Flannery and
Sorescu (1996), Saunders, Strock, and Travlos (1990), Stiroh (2004), Stiroh (2006b), Hirtle and Stiroh (2007),
Calomiris and Nissim (2007)):
Yi;t = 0 + Xi;t 1 + "i;t (1)
Equation (1) relates bank-specic stock market-based risk and valuation measures Yi;t to various lagged1
bank-specic characteristics Xi;t. We relate the dependent variable to four sets of bank characteristics,
proxying for respectively: (i) the banks funding structure, (ii) asset mix, (iii) revenue diversity and (iv)
overall bank strategy. Our vector Xi;t of bank-specic characteristics, which appears in Equation (1), is
hence given by:
Xi;t = [Bank Strategy; Funding Structure; Asset Mix; Revenue Streams]i;t (2)
Following Calomiris and Nissim (2007), we use the market-to-book value of equity as a measure of the
long-run value of the bank. The market-to-book value of equity (MTB) is measured as the end of quarter
market value divided by tangible common equity. As a measure of risk, we use the quarterly semi-volatility
(SV )2 measured over a quarterly moving window of excess stock returns for bank i (excess over the risk-free
return): Instead of using a linear regression for risk, we model semi-volatility along a stochastic frontier.3
This allows us distinguishing between banks that are on the frontier (given the characteristics associated
with their business model) and risk ine¢ cient banks. The best performing bank, relative to its peers with
1We use one-quarter lagged values rather than contemporaneous values to account for the lag with which accounting infor-
mation is disclosed. A detailed appendix discusses the construction of these indicators with a reference to the FRY9C codes of
the constitutent items.
2Semi-volatility or semi-deviation potentially captures downside risk better than total volatility. The latter is calculated using
both upside and downside changes in returns, whereas the former uses only downside returns (below the average). However, the
correlation between the two measures is high. The results presented in the paper also hold when using total volatility. Results
are available upon request.
3Stochastic frontier analysis is also a parametric approach. A non-parametric equivalent is data envelopment analysis as used
for instance by Lee and Chih (2013).
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similar characteristics, has minimal risk, and will be situated close or on the frontier.4 We call banks risk
ine¢ cient if they are situated (much) above the frontier, i.e. have much more risk compared to their best
performing peers.
Summary statistics on the dependent and independent variables are reported in Table 1. Our sample
includes all US Bank Holding Companies that have publicly traded equity for at least four consecutive
quarters in the period 1991-2007.5 The total sample consists of 17; 264 observations on 899 bank holding
companies. We exclude illiquid stocks as well as control for important mergers and acquisitions6 .
< Insert Table 1 around here >
Finding signicant relationships between these bank characteristics and the risk and valuation measure
would be evidence of the rst step in market discipline, market monitoring. If so, we can conclude that
equityholders track the di¤erent risks associated with the balance sheet and income statement characteristics.
Many studies already addressed the issue of bank monitoring, i.e. the rst step in a test for market discipline,
by relating bank risk and/or return to bank-specic characteristics (see e.g. Flannery and Sorescu (1996),
Saunders, Strock, and Travlos (1990), Stiroh (2004), Stiroh (2006b), Hirtle and Stiroh (2007) or (Calomiris
and Nissim (2007)). Our focus and contribution lies in testing for market inuencing. Nevertheless, to
allow comparison with existing studies and to be transparent with respect to the other steps of the analysis,
we briey describe the results of the baseline equation of monitoring in an appendix. While not the main
contribution of this paper, we believe we still add to this literature by considering a more comprehensive
range of bank characteristics.
4More specically, contrary to the linear model, we assume that the part of SVi;t not explained by bank characteristics can
be further decomposed in a pure noise component, i;t  iid N(0; 2v) and in one-sided departures (risk ine¢ ciencies), ui;t;
from the stochastic frontier. The stochastic frontier is determined by the equation ̂0 + ̂Xi;t 1.
5All data are collected from the publicly available FR Y-9C reports. Consequently, we link the FR Y-9C reports to
banks stock prices (obtained from CRSP) using the match provided on the Federal Reserve Bank of New York website
http://www.ny.frb.org/research/banking_research/datasets.html
6As a liquidity threshold, we impose that the bank stocks traded volume should be non-zero in at least 80 percent of trading
days during the quarter. We control for mergers and acquisitions and create a new bank identity whenever a banks total assets
increase more than 10% on a quarterly basis and there is a change in activity mix. The change in activity mix is identied
as follows. We measure activities along three dimensions (funding structure, loan portfolio composition and revenue mix).
For each of these dimensions, we create a measure of focus/diversication. If there is a large change in focus in one of these
measures, i.e. a change larger than one standard deviation, within three years after a large jump in total assets (10% growth
on a quarterly basis), we label this as a change in activity composition following the expansion.
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2.2 Extracting Stock Market Signals
Market inuencing refers to managerial actions in response to the risk and valuation assessments made in
the market monitoring stage (Bliss and Flannery (2002)). Hence, for the purpose of our study, the crucial
output from this rst stage regression described in the previous section are risk and valuation signals. We
say a bank receives an undervaluation signal when its residual (calculated using equation (1)) belongs to
the bottom decile. Equityholders are said to give a risk signal if the ine¢ ciency score is situated in the
highest decile, where risk ine¢ ciency is measured as the di¤erence between the banks semi-volatility and
the stochastic frontier (representing similar banks with the lowest risk). By only looking at the most extreme
deciles, we reduce the likelihood that investors incorporate the expected response in their assessment. Put
di¤erently, if investors expect a corrective action (as in Bond, Goldstein, and Prescott (2010)), the resulting
residual/ine¢ ciency score will be smaller. This actually works against establishing a link between signals
and outcome variables, as we only exploit the information in signals where stock market investors have low
expectations of subsequent corrective behavior. We form deciles over a backward-looking, moving window
of four years, as the intensity of market discipline may vary over time.7
The upper panel of Figure 1 provides information on the level and dynamics of the risk ine¢ ciency scores
(left hand side) and MTB residuals (right hand side), whereas the lower panel B provides information on the
frequency of banks getting a signal. Each subplot of the upper panel A presents the average ine¢ ciency score
(the deviation from the stochastic frontier or the tted regression line) of three portfolios in event time.
Each quarter, we sort BHCs into deciles according to the level of the market signal8 . The most extreme decile
(highest risk or lowest value) is represented by the thick line. We also report the least extreme decile as well
as the two middle deciles (combined in one line). The portfolio formation quarter is denoted as time period
1. We then compute the average ine¢ ciency score for each portfolio in each of the subsequent 10 quarters,
7We thus estimate the monitoring (or rules) equation using the full sample period, but determine the signals in a backward
looking way. Hence, we assume that the bank knows the benchmark equation used by investors to benchmark value or risk,
but that future realizations are unknown when determining current signals. Rather than using the entire history of data
(which would imply more information for later periods), we employ a backward looking rolling window. The latter approach
is motivated by the institutional memory hypothesisthat implies that only a recent horizon matters and not the full history
(see e.g. Berger and Udell (2004)). We set the length of the moving window at 4 years (we did experiment with windows of 5
and 6 years and get similar results).
8The gure is inspired by Lemmon, Roberts, and Zender (2008), who investigate the persistence of rm capital ratios. This
methodology is ideally suited for investigating the cross-sectional dispersion and time evolution of bank characteristics over
longer periods.
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holding the portfolio composition constant (except for BHCs that exit the sample). We repeat these two
steps of sorting and averaging for every quarter in the sample period (1993-2007). This process generates
60 sets of event-time averages, one for each quarter in our sample. We then compute the average risk
ine¢ ciency score and undervaluation residual of each portfolio across the 60 sets within each event quarter.
The dashed lines surrounding the portfolio averages represent 90% condence intervals. They are computed
as the average standard error across the 60 sets of averages (Lemmon, Roberts, and Zender (2008)).
< Insert Figure 1 around here >
At portfolio formation time (event time 1), there are large and signicant di¤erences between the three
groups. The di¤erences between the extreme signal and the average signal remain signicant for about 5 to
6 quarters. The risk ine¢ ciency score of the highest decile portfolio improves substantially in the rst four
quarters after which portfolios are created, but is still signicantly higher than the mean. The persistence
in the market-to-book signal is even slightly higher than the stickiness of the SV signal. Di¤erences between
the best and worst group are even more persistent. The graphs show that there is substantial between and
within variation in the signals, which will allow us to identify whether or not banks respond to temporary
signals. The graph also highlights that extreme market signals are sticky in the medium run but are not
persistent or long-lived.
The lower panel B of Figure 1 provides information on the fraction of banks that receive a risk or valuation
signal in a given quarter. The unconditional benchmark is 10% as we look at the extreme decile of signals.
A number in excess of 0:1 at time t indicates that there are more banks underperforming at time t relative
to the previous four years. We observe an increase in the likelihood of reveicing a negative valuation signal
in the late nineties and in 2006. The peaks in risk signals we identify coincide with the 1998 banking crisis
(induced by the Russian collapse and the LTCM debacle) and the early millennium recession, as well as the
onset of the global nancial crisis in 2007.9
2.3 Inuencing by Equityholders
The inuencing channel of market discipline implies that bankers should take o¤-setting actions to align their
performance with the interest of monitors, which are stock market investors in the context of this paper.
We investigate the market inuencing hypothesis by testing whether or not bank managers make strategic
9The time series of the frequency of banks receiving a signal is similar when using total volatility or the full sample period
(rather than using a backward looking, 4 year moving window horizon).
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reallocations following a negative risk and/or valuation signal. We are particularly interested in the e¤ect
of market signals on the capital ratio and the protability of the bank (here measured as ROE), since an
increase in bank capital reduces risk and higher prots boost bank value. However, strategic reallocations
may take di¤erent forms. Therefore, we focus on an set of seven strategic bank characteristic which are next
to the capital ratio and protability (ROE), also asset quality (non-performing loans ratio), cost ine¢ ciency
(cost-to-income ratio), liquidity (the ratio of liquid assets to total assets), the ratio of non-interest income to
total income and the dividend pay-out ratio. The ve additional strategic bank variables can be interpreted
as the underlying drivers of prots and capital levels. We believe that these ratios reect the main strategic
decision variables directly under the control of bank management.
To account for a gradual and potentially incomplete adjustment in the di¤erent strategic variables, we
estimate a partial adjustment model.10 The general specication for a partial adjustment model is:
yi;t = (y
   yi;t  ) + "i;t (3)
where y represents a strategic bank characteristic, y is the target level of y and  the speed of convergence to
this target level. To formally test for market inuencing, we investigate whether or not (i) the implied target
level is di¤erent for banks that receive a market signal and (ii) banks receiving a market signal converge
faster to the target. Therefore, Equation (3) is modied such that the adjustment speed and target level can



























i;t  ; Xi;t  ) (4)
where DSVi;t  is a dummy variable equal to one if bank i receives a risk signal at time period t   . Similarly,
DMTBi;t  is a dummy variable equal to one if bank i receives a valuation signal at time period t    . The
interaction term (DSVi;t  DMTBi;t  ) captures the additional e¤ect of banks receiving both signals simultaneously.
Since bank strategies are sticky in the short term and restructuring typically occurs as a series of incremental
adjustments, we measure reallocations over a two year period and dene  = 8 quarters to estimate Equation
10The partial adjustment model has been used quite often to model various rm characteristics, for example by Flannery
and Rangan (2006) for rm leverage (Flannery and Rangan (2008) for bank leverage), Lintner (1956) for dividend payout ratios
and Fama and French (2000), Raymar (1991) and Sarkar and Zapatero (2003) for earnings.
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(4).11 In addition, we allow for a di¤erent target level and a di¤erent speed of adjustment for banks that are
situated in the worst decile of the cross-sectional distribution of the strategic bank characteristic (Dyi;t  is
a dummy variable equal to one if the strategic bank characteristic for bank i at time t   is weak and zero
otherwise). Finally, we allow the target level y to be a function of the other strategic bank characteristics
Xi;t  (i.e. the eight strategic bank characteristics excluding the dependent variable). We estimate a reduced
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Hence, the term before the square brackets corresponds with the rst term in Equation (4), whereas
the rst term in square brackets corresponds with the expression of the conditional target, yin Equation
(4). Rather than reporting the estimated coe¢ cients of the reduced-form partial adjustment model12 , which
we estimate for each of the seven strategic bank variables under consideration, we summarize the relevant
information in two statistics that we think are easy to interpret: the long-run target level and adjustment
speed. Calculating the target levels and speed of adjustment for the eight indicators using the coe¢ cients
of Equation (6) results in eight 2 by 2 matrices in Table 2:
DMTBi;t  = 0 D
MTB
i;t  = 1
DSVi;t  = 0   c0c5  
c0+c3
c5+c8




DMTBi;t  = 0 D
MTB
i;t  = 1
DSVi;t  = 0  c5   (c5 + c8)
DSVi;t  = 1   (c5 + c7)   (c5 + c7 + c8 + c9)
The left13 hand side table contains information on the target level of the bank characteristic. The upper
11A concern is that the worst performers, which are more likely to fail or be acquired, would bias the results. Therefore, we
discard all observations up to eight quarters before the last quarter the BHC appears in the sample. Hence, this implies that
the last potential signal for each BHC occurs 16 quarters before the BHC disappears from the sample (as we look at a change
in strategic bank variables over a period of eight quarters following a risk or valuation signal).
12Results are available upon request.
13We evaluate the expression of the targets at the sample mean of the variables in the X-vector. As we standardize all
variables in the X-vector , this simply implies that they drop from the equation. Furthermore, in the paper we report results
when the dummy variable Dyi;t  = 1. Results for D
y
i;t  = 0 are similar and available upon request.
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left cell is the target level for each of the strategy variables implied by the inuencing equation in the absence
of market signals. The upper right cell contains the target level when there is only a valuation signal and the
lower left cell shows the target level in case of only a risk signal. The lower right cell contains the target level
when both market signals occur simultaneously. In each case we report the p-value to assess the statistical
signicance14 of the di¤erences with the benchmark case of no signals, i.e. the upper left cell. In the right
hand side panel, the corresponding ndings for the speed of adjustment are presented. Hence, from this
table we can infer whether or not the target level and speed of adjustment are di¤erent for banks receiving
either a risk signal, a valuation signal or both.
3 A New Test of Market Inuencing: Empirical Results
Table 2 contains the main results of this paper and are generally supportive for the hypothesis of stock
market inuencing in US banking. Starting with the capital ratio and bank protability (here measured
as ROE), we expect to nd that bank capital increases after a risk signal and that a negative valuation
signal induces bank management to improve protability. The target capital ratio in the no-signal case is
11:5%, which is in line with the summary statistics reported in Table 1. Banks that receive a risk signal
(SV ine¢ ciency in the highest decile) have a signicantly higher target capital ratio (12:2%). This indicates
that bank management reacts to a perceived increase in the riskiness of their bank by increasing the capital
bu¤er, as expected. Banks that receive a valuation signal from the stock market react by adjusting the
target capital ratio downwards (to 10:4%) and at a much faster speed. This is in line with the results of
Table A.1 (in appendix) which indicate that higher capitalized banks have lower risk and lower market-to-
book ratios. These ndings support the hypothesis that banks adjust their capital adequacy target as a
reaction to pressure from the stock market. On the prot side, we observe that the target ROE ratio slightly
decreases from 3:4% to 3:2% when the bank receives a risk signal from the stock market. However, in case
the bank gets a valuation signal, bank management reacts by signicantly increasing the target prot level
(to 4:1%). Note that ROE is expressed at the quarterly frequency. On an annual basis, this implies an
increase in target ROE from 13:6% to 16:4%. Hence, bank management responds to market pressure by
signaling a strategic refocusing aimed at increasing ROE, although the speed of adjustment does not change
signicantly, presumably indicating that increased prots take time to materialize.
14We cluster the standard errors at the bank level in the estimation of Equation (4).
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< Insert Table 2 around here >
The other strategic bank variables can be interpreted as the underlying drivers of prots and capital
levels. The following picture emerges. When banks are confronted with a risk signal, they not only adjust
their target capital level upwards, but also reduce their liquidity risk by increasing the target liquid assets
ratio from 2:6% to 4:8%. The target level for the reliance on non-interest income is lowered substantially,
although slightly insignicant at the 10% level, but the speed of adjustment towards the target increases
from 15% to 28%. Banks in the highest risk ine¢ ciency decile tend to increase their target proportion of
non-performing loans, which may be surprising at rst. However, credit risk in the loan portfolio is only one
dimension of total bank risk, which we measure as semi-volatility. The increased non-performing loans ratio
may be the outcome of increased transparency (i.e. management having to report more accurately), rather
than an actual change in credit risk.
We showed before that in case of a valuation signal, banks respond by increasing their target ROE level.
Table 2 shows that at the same time, bank managers substantially and signicantly reduce the target cost-
to-income ratio (from 61:4% in the base case to 55:0%). This indicates that bank managers try to improve
prots primarily by focusing on the cost e¢ ciency of their organization. Since management has a large
degree of discretion in altering the banks cost structure15 , this may be interpreted as a credible signal by
the stock market. When both signals occur simultaneously, the most pronounced impact, both economically
and statistically, can be observed for the implied target levels of the retail funding ratio (from 65:5% to
81:5%).
The ndings for the speed of adjustment towards the implied target levels exhibit a similar pattern,
although the degree of signicance is usually lower. Nevertheless, whenever the adjustment speed is statisti-
cally di¤erent from the benchmark no-signal case, the evidence points in the direction of a faster adjustment
towards the target. Hence, banks respond by either changing a strategic bank characteristics or by reacting
15 In unreported regressions, we investigate whether decisions in human capital management take place in response to market
signals. As a dependent variable, we constructed a binary variable, equal to one if a drop in full-time equivalent employees
takes place over a two year horizon, and equal to 0 in all other cases. The e¤ect of market signals is investigated with a probit
regression. The control variables in this set-up are the eight quarter lag in the number of employees, in addition to the strategic
bank characteristics that are also included in the specication of the target (Equation (4)). To investigate the potential reaction
to market signals, both the risk signal, the valuation signal and the interaction of both are included. The constant in the
probit regression indicates that the average probability for a layo¤ is 22%. The most important determinant of the probability
of lay-o¤s, both in economic and statistical terms, is past protability. In addition, the likelihood of layo¤s is 11% higher for
banks that simultaneously get a risk and valuation signal.
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more swiftly to deviations from the optimal level. Based on these results, we conclude that bank manage-
ment does react to stock market-based risk and valuation signals. Market signals inuence banks to adjust
the target levels of capital, prots and the main drivers of these two strategic indicators in the requested
direction. Our results help in explaining a pattern documented by Calomiris and Nissim (2007). They show
that BHCs that have lower than predicted market-to-book ratios (compared to an estimated model) tend
to experience large, statistically signicant, predictable increases in market values in subsequent quarters.
They also investigate whether the predictable changes in stock prices reect priced risk factors and nd that
they do not. Our results lend support for the view that future increases in market value in response to a
large undervaluation signal are caused by corrective actions taken by managers.
Moreover, the identied support for the inuencing hypothesis is a lower bound of the overall corrective
behavior. The key identication problem here is that stock returns reect news about (expected) funda-
mentals. Expected changes in fundamentals will lead to a spurious relationship between current signals and
future values of bank strategic variables in the opposite direction of the inuencing hypothesis. For example,
a current valuation signal may be an indication that investors worry about future cash ows and protability,
whereas inuencing implies that managers take actions to improve protability after a negative valuation
signal. In general, we nd evidence for corrective behavior as risk signals lead to more prudent behavior and
undervaluation leads to improved performance. If it would be a reection of fundamentals, it would go in
the other direction (as for example the increase in non-performing loans following a risk signal). As the two
e¤ects are di¢ cult to disentangle empirically, we prefer emphasizing the nding of inuencing, rather than
focusing on the magnitude of the impact of inuencing.16
16Another reason why we focus on the signicance rather than the magnitude of the inuencing e¤ect is a potential bias
in the adjustment coe¢ cients in dynamic models. The coe¢ cients on the lagged dependent variable may be upward biased
in the absence of a xed e¤ect and downward biased in the presence of a xed e¤ect. To address this issue, one typically
resorts to dynamic panel data estimators with internal instruments (Blundell and Bond (1998)). However, our modelling setup
is di¤erent and uses a long lag structure (of eight quarters) to allow for the slow implementation and visibility of managerial
decisions. As it is more complex to cast this in the Blundell-Bond setup, we refrain from doing so. Consequently, the level
of the adjustment coe¢ cients might be biased, but a statistical di¤erence between the di¤erent states (presence or absence of
risk/valuation signals) can still be interpreted as evidence of inuencing.
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4 Direct or Indirect Inuencing?
Some caution is necessary in the interpretation of our evidence of market discipline. As mentioned in Flannery
(2001) and Federal Reserve System (1999), market inuencing has two components. Direct market inuence
means that a certain stakeholder can assess the riskiness of bank holding companies (market monitoring) and
induce bank managers to change their risk behavior (market inuencing) in their interest. Indirect market
discipline means that the change in bank behavior is enforced by other stakeholders (e.g. supervisors) than
the stakeholder exerting the monitoring e¤ort (see also Curry, Fissel, and Hanweck (2008)). In our case,
indirect market discipline would then only be partly based on stock market information. For example,
managerial decisions could be taken in response to supervisory intervention, which could itself be triggered
by stock market signals. Disentangling direct from indirect inuence is probably the most daunting task in
the market discipline literature and probably requires a setup of a (controlled or natural) experiment or full
access to all actions (formal/informal) taken by the supervisor. In the absence thereof, we cannot completely
rule out that our ndings of market discipline are evidence of indirect inuencing. Nevertheless, we believe
that we can exclude several potential channels of indirect inuence.
4.1 Regulatory Interventions
We are not able to compare the timeliness and accuracy of regulatory bank assessments against market
evaluations, as in Berger, Davies, and Flannery (2000) or Evano¤ and Wall (2002). However, as a rst
attempt to mitigate the impact of indirect discipline exerted by supervisors, we check whether or not there
were regulatory interventions by the Federal Reserve or FDIC (as listed on their respective websites). One of
the best known supervisory interventions is Prompt Corrective Action (PCA) enacted by the Federal Deposit
Insurance Corporation Improvement Act (FDICIA) of 1991. FDICIA established capital ratio zones that
mandate PCA but also allow for discretionary intervention by regulators. This would allow us to distinguish
between direct inuence (the amount of inuencing when no PCA takes place) and indirect inuence (the
strength of the market signal over and above the supervisory intervention). We nd, however, that there were
very few enforcements or interventions17 , hence our signals are unlikely to be proxies for these regulatory
17The FDIC provides on its website a list of all enforcement decisions and orders against FDIC-insured institutions. Similar
information on PCAs with respect to Bank Holding Companies is provided by the Federal Reserve on their website. Hence,
we are able to withdraw information on all past PCAs, either for the BHC or for the underlying commercial banks. Overall,
we nd 72 records in the FDIC database, of which 67 are PCA proscriptions, 5 PCA dismissal of O¢ cers or Directors and
9 PCA Submission of Capital Plans. However, only 38 of the 72 PCAs take place during the sample period in this paper
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interventions. Next to discretionary intervention by regulators, FDICIA also denes thresholds on three
capital ratios which may trigger automatic PCA if banks are undercapitalized. We nd also these to be rare
events18 . Moreover, given that we allow the target and adjustment speed to be di¤erent for signicantly
undercapitalized banks, we believe that this is not driving our results. Nevertheless, there is still a need for
caution as unobserved actions (or other interventions) by the supervisory authorities19 may still a¤ect bank
behavior.
4.2 Subordinated Debtholders
The majority of studies on market discipline look at subordinated debt20 to infer evidence of monitoring
and inuencing. The reason is that subordinated debtholders have a concave claim on the value of the bank.
Thus, the price of subordinated debt will be informative about the probability of left-tail outcomes, and
subordinated debtholders21 will have strong incentives to monitor and curb bank risk-taking. Using subor-
dinated debt prices, most studies tend to nd no response in bank behavior when the price of subordinated
debt changes (Krishnan, Ritchken, and Thomson (2005)). This could be interpreted in two ways. On the one
hand, it may indicate a failure to nd evidence of market inuencing, possibly because the choice of issuing
subordinated debt is endogenous. Most likely, only safer banks, or banks with a conjectured support of a
safety net, will issue subordinated debt. On the other hand, the mere presence of subordinated debt may be
su¢ cient to discipline banks and make future signals (i.e. changes in price rather than the rst issuance of
(1991-2007). These 38 PCAs take place in 20 distinct nancial institutions. 14 of these institutions are not a member of a
bank holding company. Only three banks are member of a one-bank holding company. With respect to the nancial insitutions
under supervision by the Federal Reserve, we nd 27 PCAs in the period 1991-2007. However, only 6 of them (in 5 distinct
institutions) took place during our sample period.
18 In our sample, we observe 91 bank-quarter observatios in which a BHC is categorized as undercapitalized. 41 of these
breaches occur in 1991 and 1992. As of 1993, we observe on average less than one bank per quarter that is forced to take a
prompt corrective action.
19 In addition, the (nancial) market structure and supervision structure are jointly determined (Masciandaro and Quintyn
(2008)).
20For example, Ashcraft (2008), Flannery and Sorescu (1996), Goyal (2005), Sironi (2003), Balasubramnian and Cyree (2011),
Evano¤ and Wall (2002), and Blum (2002).
21Subordinated debt, which is typically used in studies of market discipline, is junior to insured debt and senior to equity.
Subordinated debtholders give credit to shareholders for the portion of risk shifted past them to the senior claimant (insured
depositors and hence the guarantor). Levonian (2001) documents that subordinated debt therefore has features of both sources
of funding. Hence, he claims that (changes in) subordinated debt prices reveal two pieces of information about the bank: Info
on market value of assets and asset volatility. Exactly the same information can be obtained from bank stock prices and for a
larger sample of banks.
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subordinated debt) uninformative.
< Insert Table 3 around here >
Therefore, we examine the presence of inuencing in the subsets of BHCs with and without outstanding
subordinated debt. Summary statistics on the bank characteristics in both subsamples are reported in Table
3. Banks in both samples di¤er signicantly from each other in almost all dimensions. The results of the
inuencing tests for both subpopulations are reported in Table 4.
< Insert Table 4 around here >
The general nding is that we obtain somewhat stronger evidence of market discipline in the subsample
of BHCs without subordinated debt. We nd weaker support for market inuencing in the subgroup of
banks issuing subordinated debt. For the latter, the target capital is not signicantly di¤erent for banks
which receive a risk or valuation signal. In the subgroup of banks that have subordinated debt, the target
ROE increases from 14% to 16% after a valuation signal, whereas banks without subordinated debt increase
this target from 13:2% to more than 17%. A higher target liquidity ratio is observed for banks receiving
both signals simultaneously. The inuencing results for the subgroup of banks without subordinated debt
are indicative for direct inuencing, since there can be no contemporaneous action or signal by debtholders.
Note also that this sample, which is by denition omitted from most of the previous literature, is also much
larger than the set of BHCs with outstanding subordinated debt (see rst line of Table 3).
4.3 Retail and Wholesale Depositors
While we can to a signicant extent exclude that our stock market based signals coincide with supervisory
interventions or pressure from the subordinated debtholders, it may still be that the response following the
risk signal is indirect if the pressure would be coming from insured retail (Demirguc-Kunt and Huizinga
(2004) and Martinez Peria and Schmukler (2001)) or uninsured wholesale depositors (Calomiris and Kahn
(1991), Huang and Ratnovski (2011)). We observe that the share of retail funding in total funding is larger
for banks receiving a joint valuation and risk signal (especially for banks without subordinated debt). Hence
retail depositors run to the bank, rather than disciplining banks. This nding is in line with Acharya and
Mora (2012)s liquidity backstop argument. The banking system seems to act as a stabilizing liquidity
insurer, and actively seeks for deposits via managing deposit rates. Furthermore, we do not nd evidence
that a BHC is more likely to observe a decrease in the amount of wholesale deposits in response to a risk
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signal. In particular, we estimate a probit model22 that relates the probability of observing a reduction in
wholesale deposits over a horizon of eight quarters to obtaining a market signals at the beginning of that
eight quarter period. We do not nd that a risk and/or valuation signal signicantly increases the probability
of a deposit outow. We interpret the latter as the absence of a run by uninsured wholesale nanciers (in
contrast to what happened to some banks in the recent crisis).
4.4 Risk versus Market-to-Book
We explore two dimensions of bank performance: risk and value. While bank risk is of interest to many
stakeholders (especially debtholders, regulators and depositors), stock market investors also care about the
long-term value of the bank. In particular, they care about the value of the bank relative to a peer group
of banks (that is why we use MTB signals conditional on a large set of bank characteristics). As no other
stakeholder is harmed by a low valuation, especially if there is no contemporaneous risk signal, a response to a
MTB signal (upper right cell of the two-by-two matrices in Table 2) can be interpreted as inuencing in favor
of the stakeholder who is giving the signal (hence direct inuencing). The results in Table 2 convincingly show
that there are signicant relationships between an undervaluation signal (MTB is substantially lower than
its peers; i.e. residual is situated in the lowest decile) and future changes in strategic bank variables. This
can be interpreted as evidence of direct inuencing in response to a valuation signal by bank equityholders.
As an extension, we also examine what happens when the bank managers get a positive valuation signal.
For example, they may also become lax after positive signals and try to maximize their own benets. To that
end, we alter the setup of inuencing and allow for a risk signal, a negative valuation signal and a positive
valuation signal (results are available upon request). We nd mixed evidence of slack or lax behavior after
receiving positive signals. Getting a positive valuation signal does not a¤ect the target levels, but does lead
to more sluggish adjustments of the capital and liquidity ratios. Hence, the main di¤erence between the
negative and positive valuation signals is that the former lead to faster adjustment to a new target, whereas
the latter only leads to slower adjustment to the same target.
4.5 Stock prices versus subordinated debt yields
Apart from a new testing strategy, this paper di¤ers from many other studies on market discipline because
it infers evidence on market monitoring and inuencing from stock prices (as in Curry, Fissel, and Hanweck
22The additional results referred to in this subsection are available upon request.
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(2008)), rather than from subordinated debt (e.g., Ashcraft (2008), Flannery and Sorescu (1996), Goyal
(2005), Sironi (2003) or Krishnan, Ritchken, and Thomson (2005)). This is motivated by at least three
reasons. First, while bank risk is of interest to many stakeholders (especially debtholders, regulators and
depositors), stock market investors also care about the long-term value of the bank. A response to a
valuation signal can be interpreted as direct inuencing in favor of the stakeholder who is giving the signal,
as no other stakeholder is harmed by a low valuation (especially if there is no contemporaneous risk signal).
Second, subordinated debtholders have a concave claim on the value of the bank. Equityholders, on the
other hand, have a convex claim on banks assets, which may cause risk-shifting incentives (Jensen and
Meckling (1976)). However, this need not be benecial to stockholders if the charter value is eroded. Park
and Peristiani (2007) show that there is a distinct convex nonlinear relationship between the market-to-book
ratio and bank risk. Based on their empirical tests, they conclude that for publicly held US BHCs, the
interests of bank stockholders are aligned with those of regulators and debtholders (except for a small subset
of extremely risky ones). Stockholders penalize riskier strategies to preserve charter value. Only when the
option value becomes large enough to compensate for the loss of charter value, stockholders elect instead to
reward risk-taking to further increase the put option value, but this only happens for a very small portion of
their sample. Third, in comparison with subordinated debt, stock prices are available for a larger sample of
banks (see rst line of Table 3). In addition, according to Kwan (2002), stock market data have an advantage
over bond market data in terms of higher quality. Stock market data are more likely to timely incorporate
information than bond prices, because stocks are traded more frequently, are easier to short, and because
they are followed by more professional analysts than bonds. Hence, we extend the test of market disciplining
to the sample of BHCs that do not have outstanding subordinated debt. This allows us to examine whether
the lack of empirical support for market discipline is due to the sample under consideration, the risk signal
(subordinated debt prices versus stock prices) or both.
Tying this evidence together, we conclude that banks respond to risk and value signals by equityholders.
Moreover, it is unlikely that other stakeholders give contemporaneous signals, which reinforces the case
in favor of direct inuencing. Moreover, we nd that banks shift to less risky activities in response to a
volatility signal, even though equityholders have a convex payo¤ function and may like risk. Moreover, this
claim is even more convincing in the case where there is both a risk and valuation signal. In these situations,
equityholders strongly indicate that the bank is taking risks for which they are not compensated and banks
react accordingly.
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5 Which banks are more likely to get signals?
We now investigate in more detail which characteristics make it more likely that a bank will receive a risk
or valuation signal. Recall that these signals are based on the extreme ine¢ ciency scores (risk signal) or
residuals (valuation signal). All else equal, banks for which the variance of the ine¢ ciency scores or residuals
is larger, will have a higher chance of receiving a risk or valuation signal. Therefore, we investigate which
bank characteristics drive the variance of the risk ine¢ ciencies or market-to-book residuals. For the semi-
volatility setup, we add scale heterogeneity to the stochastic frontier model. For the market-to-book ratio, we
use a regression model with multiplicative heteroscedasticity as in Harvey (1976).23 We make the variance
a function of time-varying bank-specic characteristics Zi;t, such that 2ui;t = exp (0 + Zi;t). We use the
exponential function to guarantee that the variance is positive. A positive and signicant  implies that
bank characteristics Zi;t increases the variance. A larger variance makes a larger risk ine¢ ciency score or
MTB residual, which may lead to inuencing, more likely. Therefore, we consider this dispersion or variance
to be the scope for pressure or signals coming from stock market investors conditional on their assessment
of banks risk and value proles. We hypothesize and test whether or not this pressure by stock market
investors is related to (1) complexity, (2) managerial discretion, and (3) opaqueness. We motivate each of
these variables individually and discuss the estimation results in parallel.
5.1 Complexity: Funding, asset and revenue composition24
In complex, diversied rms such as large BHCs, determining the nancial condition of a conglomerate might
be harder compared to assessing the nancial strength of a specialized rm. Diversication of activities might,
however, also yield more risk-e¢ cient banks if the shocks to the di¤erent types of activities are imperfectly
correlated (Laeven and Levine (2007)). Hence, one view is that equityholders use less discretion as they
expect shocks to di¤erent activities to cancel out. The other is that more diversied banks may be harder
to monitor as they leave more scope for managerial discretion. We include Hirschman Herndahl indices
(HHI) of specialization in each of the core activities of banks: a HHI for diversication in funding (deposit
diversication), a HHI for loan diversication, a HHI for revenue diversity in general (the mix between
interest and non-interest income) and a HHI capturing diversity of four non-interest income components. A
23Recently, Cerqueiro, Degryse, and Ongena (2011) use a similar model to analyze the dispersion in interest rates on loans
issued to small and medium-sized enterprises.
24Although the stochastic frontier model with scale heterogeneity or the multiplicative heteroscedastic regression model is
modelled in one step, the results are discussed in two steps.
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higher value of the HHI indicates that a bank has a more focused orientation25 . Lower values point to more
diversication. As the two e¤ects of complexity work in opposite directions, we include earnings volatility to
control for the risk reduction generated by portfolio diversication. If the portfolio risk-reduction view holds,
we should nd that more stable prots (potentially caused by combining imperfectly correlated activities)
lead to a lower variance. In addition, BHCs may alter their scope either by restructuring their activities or
by expanding their size. We include loan growth to control for banksoverall expansion strategies. A high
growth rate might indicate that banks expanded via mergers and acquisitions or attracted a new pool (of
probably more risky) borrowers26 .
< Insert Table 5 around here >
The estimation results can be found in Table 5. The variance of total risk ine¢ ciency is positively related
to specialization. This indicates that, from a monitoring perspective, the portfolio e¤ects of diversication
more than compensate the cost of increased complexity that diversication may entail. Note that this e¤ect
is not only statistically, but also economically signicant. A one standard deviation increase in income
specialization increases the dispersion of total risk with 16:2%.
A higher loan growth rate leads to a larger variance in the valuation of BHCs. Hence, an expansionary
strategy makes it more di¢ cult to assess the true value. More stable earnings, reected by a lower ROE
volatility, lead to a lower dispersion in total risk ine¢ ciency scores as well as in the residual variance of
the market-to-book ratio. For instance, a one standard deviation increase in ROE volatility leads to an
increase in the variance of (risk) ine¢ ciency of 25%. This suggests that the preference equityholders have
for stable revenue streams dominates the potential negative e¤ects that earnings smoothing and managerial
discretion may have on their ability to assess the situation of the bank. However, volatility of prots is only







and is the sum of the squared
activity shares (i is a bank indicator, t is time and j=1,...,J refers to the activities over which one measures specializa-
tion/diversication). We compute four di¤erent HHI-measures: a HHI for diversication in funding (J=3, Noninterest Bearing
Deposits, Interest Bearing Core Deposits and Wholesale funding), a HHI for loan diversication (J=5, C&I Loans, Real Estate
Loans, Agriculture Loans, Consumer Loans, Other Loans), a HHI for revenue diversity in general (J=2, interest and non-interest
income) and a HHI capturing diversity of the four non-interest income components (J=4, Fiduciary Activities, Service Charges
on Deposits Accounts, Trading Revenue, Other Non Interest Income).
26For example by an expansion into subprime loans (see e.g. Knaup and Wagner (2012)) or by increasing the share of di¢ cult-
to-value Level III assets. Unfortunately, these conjectures cannot be tested in our sample as (i) the build up of subprime loans
only happened in the latter sample years and (ii) reporting the amount of "Level 3 fair value measurements of loans and leases"
(item bhckf245) only became compulsory in the last year of our sample (more precisely as of 2007-03-31).
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a crude proxy of managerial discretion and earnings smoothing. As emphasized in Hirtle (2007), disclosure
plays an important role in market discipline since market participants need to have meaningful and accurate
information on which to base their judgments of risk and performance.
5.2 Managerial Discretion and Earnings Forecast Dispersion
We measure disclosure in a qualitative sense and focus on the extent to which bank managers have discretion
in reporting certain accounting items, with a potential impact on the banks perceived value and risk prole.
We hypothesize that the variance of the ine¢ ciency term will be larger for banks with more discretion in
earnings reporting.
To empirically investigate this hypothesis, we test whether or not bank-specic volatility, 2ui;t , of either
the MTB residual or the risk ine¢ ciency term, is increasing in measures of managerial discretion. Managers
can both over- and underprovision for expected loan losses and either postpone or prepone the realization
of securities gains and losses. As in Beatty, Ke, and Petroni (2002) and Cornett, McNutt, and Tehranian
(2009), we measure discretionary loan loss provisions by regressing27 loan loss provisions on total assets,
non-performing loans, loan loss allowances and the di¤erent loan classes. The discretionary component of
loan loss provisioning is the absolute value of the error term of this regression. Similarly, the discretionary
component of realized security gains and losses is the absolute value of the error term of the regression
of realized security gains and losses on total assets and unrealized security gains and losses. If managers
use more discretion in loan loss provisioning and realizing trading gains, the residuals of these models will
be larger. Both point to discretion in earnings management which may obscure true performance. While
unexpected loan loss provisions and security gains and losses may make bank performance more di¢ cult to
assess, it is often used to smooth earnings over time (Laeven and Majnoni (2003)).
Secondly, we relate the volatility of the SV ine¢ ciency term and the MTB residual to opaqueness,
measured by the dispersion in analystsearnings per share (EPS) forecasts. This measure is widely used in
the accounting literature to measure rm transparency (see e.g. Lang, Lins, and Ma¤ett (2012)), as well as
in the banking literature by Flannery, Kwan, and Nimalendran (2004) who compare the opaqueness of US
bank holding companies with similar-sized non-banking rms. We obtain the earnings forecast data from
the Institutional Brokers Estimate System (IBES). We calculate the dispersion measure on a quarterly basis
as the cross-sectional dispersion in the most recent forecast of all analysts that made their prediction within
27Results from these regressions are available upon request.
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the last year. We include only the analysts last forecasts and require this forecast to be made in the 4
quarters prior to the end of the quarter to avoid that stale forecasts would bias our dispersion measure. To
avoid the documented downward bias in forecasted EPS induced by the way IBES adjusts for stock splits,
we closely follow the adjustment method described in Diether, Malloy, and Scherbina (2002) and Glushkov
and Robinson (2006). Finally, we only include the quarterly dispersion measure if at least two separate
analyst forecasts are available. After applying the di¤erent lters, we end up with a dataset consisting of 495
banks28 and 8271 bank-quarter observations. The average number of analyst forecasts per bank per quarter
is a satisfying 9:04.
The estimation results are presented in Table 5. We not only include the managerial discretion and
earnings forecast disagreement measures, but also loan growth, ROE volatility and the di¤erent complexity
indicators. It is comforting that the results for those variables are very similar in the reduced sample
compared to the full sample. With respect to management discretion, we nd that stock market investors
exert more pressure in their assessment of risk for banks exhibiting a high discretionary behavior in the
realization of securities gains/losses. A one standard deviation increase in this discretion measure leads to a
14% increase in the dispersion of total risk ine¢ ciencies. Discretionary behavior in loan loss provisioning also
matters for risk, but to a lesser extent. However, the main goal of active discretion in loan loss provisioning
is earnings smoothing, which is considered favorably (i.e. stable prot streams lead to a lower variance of the
MTB residuals and the SV ine¢ ciencies). In fact, the leeway managers permit themselves in dealing with
problem loans leads to more pressure by bank equityholders in their assessment of bank value. Dispersion
in IBES analyst forecasts unambiguously increases the variance of both signals. This not only suggests
that banks di¤er substantially in their degrees of opaqueness, but also that stock market investors take
these di¤erences into account. The dispersion in total risk ine¢ ciencies increases by 17:7% (12:4% for MTB
residuals) in response to a one standard deviation increase in analyst forecasts dispersion.
28We lose a signicant number of bank-quarter observations when matching the existing dataset with IBES data. Both
datasets are merged as follows. The main identier in IBES is the IBES ticker, whereas the main identier in CRSP is the
permno of the bank. Hence, in order to merge the information of both les, the best approach is to use common secondary
identiers to construct a linking table that relates the permno of the bank to the IBES ticker. We follow the procedure proposed
by WRDS (Moussawi (2006)), which assigns a score to each match, according to the quality of the link.
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6 Conclusion
The nancial crisis of 2007-09 has illustrated that the choice of business models and (lack of) transparency in
banking may have profound consequences for the risk prole of the banks. Even within certain bank business
models, we noticed a large discrepancy of banksvulnerability to adverse shocks. The question we address is
whether or not information about BHC risk and valuation can be extracted from stock market information
and whether or not market signals are su¢ ciently strong to force banks to alter their risk and performance
prole. These are the two faces of market discipline: monitoring and inuencing. If the stock market is
able to monitor bank risk, this information is useful for supervisors and they should include market-based
risk indicators in their information set. If the stock market is able to inuence bank risk behavior, this can
be complementary to supervisory actions and reinforce them. In this paper, we develop an empirical setup
to examine the ability of stock market investors to monitor and inuence bank risk and performance in a
sample of US BHCs over the period 1991-2007.
We investigate the inuencing hypothesis by analyzing if and to what extent bank managers react to risk
and valuation signals from the stock market over a medium to long-run horizon. The hypothesis is that banks
exhibiting a relatively high degree of risk ine¢ ciency will respond by taking remedial action in order to adjust
their risk prole. Similarly, banks that are judged to underperform relative to their peers are expected to alter
their cost and revenue structure to improve bank value. In contrast to most of the extant literature, we do
nd evidence of stock market inuencing in US banking. Banks that receive a risk signal react by increasing
their capital bu¤er and lowering their liquidity risk. These actions are in line with predictions and with the
objective of supervisors. Banks receiving a negative valuation signal react by increasing their target prot
level, primarily by lowering the cost-to-income ratio, indicating that most of the performance improvement
is intended to come from the cost e¢ ciency side. Hence, these corrective actions taken by managers in
response to a large undervaluation signal may lead to future increases in market value, which may explain
the nding by Calomiris and Nissim (2007) that BHCs that have lower than predicted market-to-book ratios
(compared to an estimated model) tend to experience large, statistically signicant, predictable increases in
market values in subsequent quarters. Finding evidence of inuencing in this setup is indicative for a type of
market discipline that Bliss and Flannery (2002) label "more benign and commonplace" compared to, e.g.,
a distressed takeover, outright defaults or executive turnovers.
Next to investigating the response to risk and valuation signals, we also analyze which banks are more
likely to get signals. We nd that stock market investors punish discretionary behavior, especially in the
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case of security gains and losses. More unpredictable banks exhibit larger deviations in terms of risk and
valuation. We also nd strong evidence that the degree of opaqueness is positively related to the variance
of the risk ine¢ ciencies and valuation residuals. Regulation should be designed to lower the degree of
discretion that bank managers can exercise. A reduction in the opacity of banks can be achieved by fostering
information disclosure, e.g. through a timely and accurate publication of relevant on and o¤ balance sheet
risk exposures. Providing better information may allow banks to avoid large random stock market penalties
in terms of risk or valuation. Hence, one set of results indicates which banks are more likely to receive a
risk and/or valuation signal. The other set of results provides insight in how a bank responds to a signal. It
might be an interesting avenue for further research to combine these. In particular, it may be interesting to
analyze the extent to which inuencing (i.e. the impact of risk/valuation signals on the target or speed of
adjustment) varies with the transparency or opacity of the bank.
To rule out that our results are driven by indirect inuencing, we also investigate the contribution of
other potential monitors, such as subordinated debtholders, retail and wholesale depositors and supervisors.
We nd that regulatory enforcement actions are unlikely to explain our results, that inuencing is most
pronounced in banks without subordinated debt and that wholesale depositors are not reacting to our risk
signals. Nevertheless, as in most other studies addressing this issue, there is a need for caution since other
sources of discipline, such as unobserved actions taken by the supervisory authorities, may a¤ect bank
behavior.
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Figure 1: Dynamic Behavior of the Risk and Valuation Signals
Panel A: Level and dynamics of e¢ ciency scores
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The upper panel consists of two subplots, one for the risk signal and one for the market-to-book signal. Each subplot presents the
average ine¢ ciency score or extent of misvaluation of three portfolios in event time. Each quarter, we sort BHCs into deciles according
to the size of the signal. The portfolio formation quarter is denoted time period 1. We then compute the average signal size for each
portfolio in each of the subsequent 10 quarters, holding the portfolio composition constant (except for BHCs that exit the sample).
We repeat these two steps of sorting and averaging for every quarter in the sample period (1993-2007). This process generates 60 sets
of event-time averages, one for each quarter in our sample. We then compute the average signal size of each portfolio across the 60
sets within each event quarter. The most extreme decile (highest risk or lowest value) is indicated by the thicker red line. The least
extreme decile as well as the two middle deciles (combined in one portfolio) are indicated in black. The dashed lines surrounding the
portfolio averages represent 90 per cent condence bounds. They are computed as the average standard error across the 60 sets of
averages (Lemmon et al., 2008). The lower panel provides information on the fraction of banks receiving a signal in a given quarter. A
bank is said to receive a signal if the ine¢ ciency score of the bank at time t is among the 10 per cent worst ine¢ ciency scores (of all
banks) observed over the preceding four years.
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Table 1: Summary Statistics of Variables Used in the Analysis of Bank Monitoring
Variable Mean Std. Dev. Min. Max. N
PANEL A
Valuation and risk metric based on banksshare price
Semi volatility 0.2972 0.1342 0.1026 0.8426 17264
Market-to-Book Value of Equity 2.3758 1.1545 0.5196 7.2331 17216
PANEL B
Bank Strategy Variables
ln(Total Assets) 15.0901 1.5793 12.194 19.7077 17264
Tier 1 Risk-Based Capital Ratio 11.7388 3.1518 6.2556 27.72 17264
Non-Performing Loans Ratio 0.0114 0.013 0 0.0853 17264
Cost to Income 0.6384 0.12 0.3732 1.188 17264
Return on Equity 0.0324 0.0179 -0.0836 0.0686 17264
Liquid Assets 0.0455 0.0909 -0.1711 0.3711 17264
Funding Structure
Non-Interest-Bearing Deposits Share 0.1326 0.0704 0.0158 0.391 17264
Interest-Bearing Core Deposits Share 0.6687 0.1123 0.2867 0.8827 17264
Wholesale Funding Share 0.197 0.1052 0.0277 0.5896 17264
Deposits to Total Assets 0.7609 0.1056 0.3603 0.9238 17264
Asset Mix
Real Estate Loan Share 0.6316 0.1876 0.0653 0.9797 17264
Commercial and Industrial Loan Share 0.1935 0.1185 0.0034 0.6332 17264
Agricultural Loan Share 0.01 0.0208 0 0.1295 17264
Consumer Loan Share 0.1175 0.0999 0.001 0.5009 17264
Other Loan Share 0.0415 0.0592 0 0.3464 17264
Loans to Total Assets 0.6432 0.1209 0.2144 0.8709 17264
Revenue Streams
Interest Income Share 0.7373 0.1382 0.2487 0.9613 17264
Non-Interest Income Share 0.2627 0.1382 0.0387 0.7513 17264
Fiduciary Activities Income Share 0.0379 0.06 0 0.3835 17264
Service Charges on Deposit Accounts Share 0.0747 0.0369 0.0003 0.1806 17264
Trading Revenue Share 0.006 0.0186 -0.0078 0.1117 17264
Other Non-Interest Income Share 0.1405 0.1139 0.0075 0.6652 17264
Deposit-Loan Synergies
Deposit Loan Synergies 0.039 0.0306 0.0006 0.2723 17264
Unused Loan Commitments Share 0.1765 0.0957 0.0203 0.536 17264
Transaction Deposits Share 0.2214 0.1084 0.0298 0.5079 17264
This table contains summary statistics on the variables used in the analysis of bank monitoring and consists of two parts.
In panel A, we provide information on the equity market-based risk and value measures (the dependent variables). For
the calculation of semi-volatility, we take the lower deviation of the daily bank stock returns within a quarter. We then
semi-volatility by multiplying with the squared root of 252. We also compute a market-based valuation metric, which is
the market value to the book value of tangible common equity. Both variables are measured over the period 1991-2007 on
a quarterly basis. Panel B of this table contains information on the independent variables. Bank size is measured as the
natural logarithm of total assets expressed in US dollar thousands and deated to 2007:Q4 values. All other variables are
measured as ratios. For detailed information on the exact computation of the ratios, we refer to the Appendix. Income
statement data are reported on a calendar year-to-date basis in the FRY9C reports and are therefore converted to quarter-
to-quarter changes before computing ratios. The variables are measured over the period 1991-2007 on a quarterly basis.
The sample includes all US Bank Holding Companies that have publicly traded equity for at least four consecutive quarters.
Furthermore, we exclude banks of which the stock has zero trading volume for at least twenty percent of the observations.
The nal sample consists of 17264 observations on 899 bank holding companies. All variables are winsorized at the 1 percent
level.
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Table 2: Evidence of market Inuencing: The impact of market signals on the Target ratio and Adjustment
Speed
Target Ratio Adjustment Speed
MTB=0 MTB=1 MTB=0 MTB=1
Tier 1 Risk-Based Capital Ratio SV=0 11.488 10.426*** 0.291 0.413*
0.001 0.064
SV=1 12.223** 11.441 0.334 0.606***
0.039 0.927 0.500 0.000
Return on Equity SV=0 0.034 0.041*** 0.539 0.532
0.000 0.921
SV=1 0.032* 0.033 0.550 0.515
0.067 0.802 0.825 0.842
Non-Performing Loans Ratio SV=0 0.711 0.645 0.562 0.608
0.220 0.114
SV=1 0.959*** 0.712 0.640 0.730
0.000 0.989 0.196 0.142
Cost to Income Ratio SV=0 0.614 0.550*** 0.337 0.329
0.001 0.881
SV=1 0.663*** 0.625 0.294 0.314
0.007 0.805 0.389 0.852
Liquidity Ratio SV=0 0.026 0.037 0.230 0.299
0.249 0.163
SV=1 0.048* 0.025 0.223 0.157
0.077 0.975 0.904 0.287
Non-Interest Income Share SV=0 0.323 0.411 0.147 0.106
0.216 0.285
SV=1 0.291 0.322 0.276** 0.309**
0.117 0.969 0.035 0.031
Dividend Payout Ratio SV=0 0.390 0.349*** 0.571 0.723**
0.002 0.024
SV=1 0.379 0.385 0.621 0.572
0.612 0.907 0.401 0.991
This table contains results on the market inuencing tests. We use a partial adjustment model to test whether or not
reallocations in strategic bank characteristics occur in response to a risk (SV) and/or valuation (MTB) signal. We focus on
the e¤ect on seven strategic bank characteristics: the capital ratio, asset quality (non-performing-loans ratio), cost e¢ ciency
(cost-to-income ratio), protability (ROE), liquidity ratio (the ratio of liquid assets to total assets), the ratio of non-interest
































For sake of space and clarity, we only report the target level (left panel) and the speed of adjustment (right panel) for the
seven indicators. We report the target and adjustment speed in four distinct cases where (1) the bank neither gets a a
risk nor valuation signal (dummy SV= dummy MTB=0, the upper left cell), (2) the bank gets only a risk signal (dummy
SV=1, dummy MTB=0, the lower left cell), (3) the bank gets only a valuation signal (dummy SV=0, dummy MTB=1, the
upper right cell) and (4) the bank gets both a risk and a valuation signal (dummy SV= dummy MTB=1, the lower right
cell). This results in fourteen 2 by 2 matrices. In each case, we report the p-value in parentheses to assess the statistical
signicance of the di¤erences with the benchmark case of no signal, i.e. the upper left cell. Signicant di¤erences (w.r.t. to
the benchmark case) at the 10, 5 and 1 per cent level are indicated with *, ** and ***, respectively.
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Table 3: Summary statistics of a sample split of banks with and without Subordinated Debt
Subordinated Debt
NO YES p-value
Number of Observations 4363 1821
ln(Total Assets) 14.363 16.684 0.000
Tier 1 Risk-Based Capital Ratio 12.886 9.810 0.000
Non-Performing Loans Ratio 0.884 1.042 0.000
Cost to Income 0.624 0.629 0.135
Return on Equity 0.033 0.038 0.000
Liquid Assets 0.088 0.104 0.000
Non-Interest Income Share 0.218 0.348 0.000
Dividend Payout ratio 0.342 0.362 0.000
Subordinated debt/Total Capital 0.000 0.213 0.000
Risk Signal 0.144 0.079 0.000
Valuation Signal 0.100 0.123 0.010
Joint Signal 0.015 0.010 0.209
This table provides summary statistics on bank size, the seven strategic bank characteristics, the amount of
subordinated debt in total capital and the frequency of risk signals, valuation signals or joint signals. We
compare the means of the variables in the subsamples of banks with subordinated debt (the rst column)
and bank without subordinated debt (the second column). The third column contains the p-value of the














































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































A Online Appendix - Monitoring Bank Risk and Equityholder
Value
An essential rst step in our test for market inuencing is to establish a relationship between bank-specic risk
and performance measures and various (lagged) bank-specic characteristics, this within either a stochastic
frontier (risk) or linear regression (valuation) framework. The extensive literature on market monitoring,
which shows that securityholders indeed distinguish between banks with di¤erent risk proles, provides good
guidance on which proxies to include (see e.g. Flannery and Sorescu (1996), Saunders, Strock, and Travlos
(1990), Stiroh (2004), Stiroh (2006b), Hirtle and Stiroh (2007)). To allow comparison with existing studies
and to be transparent with respect to the other steps of the analysis, we briey describe in this appendix the
results of the baseline equation. While not the main contribution of this paper, we believe we still add to this
literature by considering a more comprehensive range of bank characteristics which a¤ect a banks business
model. To assess how potential di¤erences in the bankscomposition of assets, liabilities and operational
characteristics are reected in bank risk and value, we relate SV (Semi-Volatility) and MTB (Market-to-
Book) to four sets of bank characteristics, proxying for: (i) overall bank strategy, (ii) the banks funding
structure (Calomiris and Nissim (2007), Demirguc-Kunt and Huizinga (2010), Hirtle and Stiroh (2007)), (iii)
asset mix (as e.g., Calomiris and Nissim (2007), Morgan and Stiroh (2001)), and (iv) revenue diversity (as
e.g., Stiroh (2006), Stiroh (2006b), De Jonghe (2010)), as well as variables proxying for deposit-loan liquidity
synergies (Gatev, Schuermann, and Strahan (2009)). Our vector Xi;t of bank-specic characteristics, which
appears in Equation (1) in the paper, is hence given by:
Xi;t = [Bank Strategy; Funding Structure; Asset Mix; Revenue Streams]i;t (A.1)
Summary statistics are reported in Table 1 of the paper. All data are collected from the publicly available
FR Y-9C reports. The denition and construction of each variable is described in Appendix B. Consequently,
we link the FR Y-9C reports to banksstock prices using the match provided on the Federal Reserve Bank of
New York website29 . Controlling for a large set of bank characteristics is important for our tests of market
inuencing. Both the magnitude and the accuracy of the risk and valuation signals, and hence the accuracy
of our test of market inuencing, will depend to a great extent on the quality and level of the bank-specic
characteristics included in either the stochastic frontier (SV) or linear regression (MTB) model.
Our sample includes all US Bank Holding Companies that have publicly traded equity for at least four
consecutive quarters in the period 1991-2007. The total sample consists of 17; 264 observations on 899
29http://www.ny.frb.org/research/banking_research/datasets.html
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bank holding companies. Our sample period covers two full business cycles as well as a number of stressed
periods.30 The impact of these events and the business cycle is captured by time xed e¤ects. We now
motivate the bank-specic variables and their e¤ect on risk and value group by group. The discussion is
based on the estimation results reported in the rst two columns of Table A.1, which correspond with a
model without conditional variance. In columns 3 and 4, we report the results of a model with conditional
variance (as used in Section 5 of the paper). We only refer to the latter results in the few cases where they
di¤er from the former.
< Insert Table A.1 around here >
To facilitate the economic interpretation of the coe¢ cients, we standardize all independent variables.
Bank xed e¤ects are included in all estimations.
Bank Strategy Variables The bank-specic proxies for overall bank strategy capture strategic choices
made by bank managers that may a¤ect a banks risk and valuation prole. We include the regulatory Tier
1 capital ratio31 and the liquid-to-total-assets ratio to incorporate the possibility that better capitalized and
more liquid institutions may be less vulnerable to shocks. Asset quality is measured by the ratio of loans
past due 90 days or more and non-accrual loans to total loans. We also include the cost-to-income ratio as
a measure of cost e¢ ciency. This ratio measures the overheads or costs of running the bank as a percentage
of total operating income before provisions. Finally, we include (the log of) bank size32 as larger banks
may diversify their risk more and may enjoy economies of scale (Hughes, Mester, and Moon (2001)), and
bank protability (ROE) to control for a risk-return trade-o¤. The rst part of Table A.1 indicates that
stock market participants accurately identify and assess the e¤ect of the di¤erent bank strategy variables on
30Our sample period does not span the extreme events of the global nancial crisis that started in 2007. See e.g. Shehzad
and De Haan (2013), for a study that analyzes the drivers of bank stock performance in the global nancial crisis.
31The capital measure used in this paper is the Tier 1 risk-based capital ratio. However, as mentioned in Ashcraft (2008),
the relevant capital measure for regulators is equity capital plus subordinated debt, as this is the cushion regulators consider
before the claims of depositors are a¤ected. Comparison of both capital measures indicates that the correlation is very high.
Estimating the frontier set-up with the regulatory capital measure yields similar results. They are available upon request.
32Bank size is, to a large extent, the outcome of strategic choices made by banks and is hence highly correlated with the other
control variables, and, more importantly, with the measures that capture the various business models we consider. Therefore,
we orthogonalize size with respect to all other variables. The natural logarithm of total assets is regressed on all independent
variables. The idea is to decompose bank size in an organic growth component and a historical size component, the residual.
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semi-volatility and the market-to-book value. Larger banks have a higher market-to-book ratio. More cost
e¢ cient banks, with less credit risk (higher asset quality) that are more protable will have lower risk and
higher valuations. A larger regulatory capital ratio makes banks safer but harms their long-term value.
Funding Structure We decompose total deposits in three types: Interest-bearing core deposits, non-
interest-bearing deposits and wholesale funding. The rst is the share of deposits held by retail depositors,
which are protected by the deposit insurance scheme. Wholesale funding providers are generally more
sensitive to changes in the credit risk prole of the institutions to which they provide these funds. As such,
they are expected to track the institutions nancial condition more closely and withdraw money more swiftly
when they detect a deterioration in the banks risk prole. With respect to the funding composition, we nd
that in our sample (which coincides with the pre-crisis period), there are no di¤erences across deposit types
in their e¤ect on SV or MTB.
Asset Mix We nd that banks which mainly focus on their core activity (a large loans-to-asset ratio)
exhibit lower market-to-book values (but are also less risky). Next to including the loan-to-asset ratio, we
classify loans according to borrower types. The loan portfolio composition33 may have an impact on stock
market participantsperceptions of banksrisk exposures. We categorize loans as commercial and industrial
(C&I) loans, real-estate loans, consumer loans, agricultural loans and a catch-all share that includes all
other loans. We leave the real estate loan share out of the equation to avoid perfect collinearity. Table 1
in the paper shows that banksloan portfolio composition varies substantially in the sample. The average
banks loan portfolio consists of 63% real estate loans, 19% C&I loans and 12% consumer loans. Banks with
a higher proportion of consumer loans face lower semi-volatility. The commercial and industrial loan share
has a small positive impact on total risk. Hence, we conrm the evidence by Morgan and Stiroh (2001) who
found that bond spreads are increasing in commercial and industrial lending.
Revenue Streams The activities of deposit-taking and lending predominantly generate interest margin.
However, some banks also generate a substantial amount of non-interest income (Stiroh (2006)). Therefore,
33The FRY9C reports do not allow to distinguish directly between high and low quality loans within each category (e.g.:
focus on subprime versus prime loans within real estate loans). Note, however, that such di¤erences should show up in the
non-performing loans ratio. Moreover, to the extent that this is a deliberate, time-invariant choice, it will be captured by the
bank xed e¤ects. In unreported regressions, we included charge-o¤ rates by loan type. This does not a¤ect our ndings on
monitoring and the identication of the risk and valuation signals.
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we also include variables capturing the importance of income generated by duciary activities and trading-
related income. All other activities that generate non-interest income are captured in the other non-interest
income share. Previous studies have documented that non-interest income is in general more risky than
interest income (e.g. Stiroh (2006b) and Demirguc-Kunt and Huizinga (2010)). Our breakdown of non-
interest income in four subcomponents yields additional insights. First, relative to the omitted interest
income share, trading revenues and other non-interest income34 subcomponents lead to higher semi-volatility.
Second, banks with a larger fraction of their income generated by service charges on deposit accounts
experience lower stock market semi-volatility. However, this coe¢ cient is no longer signicant in column 3.
Finally, we include three indicators to measure the potential diversication e¤ects of liquidity risk on
the asset and liability side of the balance sheet. Gatev, Schuermann, and Strahan (2009) nd scope for
deposit-loan synergies.35 Banks exposed to loan-liquidity risk without high levels of transaction deposits
have higher risk. Bank risk is expected to rise with unused commitments (reecting asset-side liquidity risk
exposure) and the use of transaction deposits (reecting liability-side liquidity risk exposure). The synergy
e¤ect is measured by the interaction term between the ratio of unused loan commitments and transaction
deposits. Two of the three e¤ects are conrmed in our sample. The transaction deposits increase bank risk,
but the combination with unused loan commitments provides a statistically and economically signicant
hedge against liquidity risk and reduces the risk of the bank.
Overall, we can conclude that stock market investors accurately identify the di¤erent risks associated
with the balance sheet and income statement characteristics and use this in their assessment of the banks
valuation and risk prole. Although this evidence does not yet establish that market discipline can e¤ectively
control banking rms, it soundly rejects the hypothesis that investors cannot rationally di¤erentiate among
the risks undertaken by the major U.S. banking rms. This is evidence of the rst step in market discipline,
market monitoring, which is a necessary but not a su¢ cient condition to support the market inuencing
hypothesis.
Robustness and remarks As a robustness check, we also include state xed e¤ects for at least two
reasons. First, unobserved heterogeneity at the state level, such as state-specic regulation or the composition
34Other non-interest income are predominantly fees and commissions from investment banking and underwriting, (re)insurance
underwriting and venture capital revenue.
35Quijano (2013)s results provide an additional motiviation to control for deposit-loan synergies.
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of the local economy may a¤ect banksriskiness as well as their business mix. Second, Mester (1997) has
documented that controlling for heterogeneity in stochastic frontier analysis is important to obtain accurate
estimates of ine¢ ciency. Rather than estimating the frontier at the state or region level, which would yield
imprecise estimates as the number of observations is small for many states, we allow the intercept of the
stochastic frontier to be di¤erent across states. Signicance and magnitude of the coe¢ cients are quite
similar in both speciciations. In the few di¤erences, we never obtain conicting results in terms of sign.
It is worth stressing that the (rank)correlation between the ine¢ ciency scores with and without state xed
e¤ects is almost perfect. In sum, including state xed e¤ects does not alter the results.
In the multiplicative heteroscedastic regression setup (the setup for MTB), we cluster the standard
errors at the bank level (which yields the most conservative standard errors). Unfortunately, clustering
techniques have not yet been implemented in the standard stochastic frontier models. Moreover, it is even
more complicated in our extended approach in which we also model the variance of the ine¢ ciency score.
Fortunately, as clustering does not a¤ect the coe¢ cients or ine¢ ciency score/residual, but only the standard
errors of the coe¢ cients; our setup to test for the presence and strength of inuencing (which is our main
contribution) is una¤ected by the choice of clustering.
Finally, the signals obtained from estimating a model with and without scale heterogeneity (i.e. modelling
the variance as a function of bank characteristics) are very similar. The correlation between the ine¢ ciency
scores in column 1 and 3 is 95%, whereas the correlation between the residuals of equation 2 and 4 is even
higher 98%. Recall that we dened signals as belonging to the highest decile. 84% of the SV signals based
on column 3 would also be classied as signals in column 1. An additional 14% of signals based on column 3,
belongs to the 9th decile (rather than the 10th decile) if signals were based on column 1. The correspondence
is even higher with respect to market-to-book-signals. 90% of the MTB signals based on column 4 belong
to the extreme decile based on column2. An additional 9:6% belongs to the 9th decile of residuals based on
column 2.
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Table A.1: Semi-Volatility and Market-to-Book: evidence of monitoring
Semi Volatility Market-to-Book Semi Volatility Market-to-Book
SFA OLS SFA (with scale) Cond. Het. reg
Bank Strategy Variables
Bank Size 0.000172 0.183* -0.00112 0.231**
(0.00319) (0.110) (0.00313) (0.0932)
Tier 1 Risk-Based Capital Ratio -0.0137*** -0.277*** -0.00932*** -0.273***
(0.00184) (0.0471) (0.00184) (0.0423)
Non-Performing Loans Ratio 0.0139*** -0.0862*** 0.00940*** -0.0948***
(0.00113) (0.0299) (0.00120) (0.0253)
Cost to Income 0.00182 -0.128** 0.00302 -0.148***
(0.00190) (0.0592) (0.00191) (0.0520)
Return on Equity -0.0120*** 0.0868*** -0.00709*** 0.124***
(0.00111) (0.0221) (0.00125) (0.0227)
Liquid Assets 0.00569*** 0.00473 0.00390** 0.0204
(0.00165) (0.0362) (0.00161) (0.0304)
Funding Structure
Interest-Bearing Core Deposits Share -0.000799 -0.0407 -0.00172 -0.0202
(0.00361) (0.0748) (0.00358) (0.0646)
Wholesale Funding Share -0.00208 -0.0819 -0.00209 -0.0655
(0.00366) (0.0780) (0.00358) (0.0662)
Deposits to Total Assets -0.00350 -0.0666 -0.00167 -0.126**
(0.00229) (0.0668) (0.00224) (0.0574)
Asset Mix
Commercial and Industrial Loan Share 0.0117*** -0.0308 0.0136*** 0.0111
(0.00227) (0.0512) (0.00225) (0.0427)
Agricultural Loan Share -0.00105 -0.0404 0.000762 -0.0483
(0.00213) (0.0382) (0.00205) (0.0367)
Consumer Loan Share -0.0116*** 0.00345 -0.0107*** 0.0363
(0.00229) (0.0644) (0.00224) (0.0526)
Other Loan Share 0.00480** 0.139** 0.00578*** 0.118*
(0.00227) (0.0651) (0.00223) (0.0669)
Loans to Total Assets -0.00714*** -0.120*** -0.00588*** -0.120***
(0.00186) (0.0455) (0.00183) (0.0387)
Revenue Streams
Fiduciary Activities Income Share 0.00703** 0.199 0.00826*** 0.286**
(0.00274) (0.161) (0.00272) (0.122)
Service Charges on Deposit Accounts Share -0.00413** 0.0423 -0.00187 0.0306
(0.00210) (0.0590) (0.00206) (0.0476)
Trading Revenue Share 0.00491*** 0.0707** 0.00425*** 0.0803**
(0.00157) (0.0350) (0.00150) (0.0316)
Other Non-Interest Income Share 0.00841*** 0.167*** 0.00748*** 0.170***
(0.00185) (0.0561) (0.00190) (0.0505)
Deposit-Loan Synergies
Deposit Loan Synergies -0.00646** -0.108* -0.00650** -0.0925
(0.00306) (0.0617) (0.00299) (0.0599)
Unused Loan Commitments Share -0.000626 0.112 0.00118 0.0959
(0.00294) (0.0710) (0.00288) (0.0645)
Transaction Deposits Share 0.00438* 0.0300 0.00530** 0.0438
(0.00263) (0.0553) (0.00255) (0.0472)
Observations 17264 17216 17264 17216
Bank Fixed E¤ects YES YES YES YES
Time Fixed E¤ects YES YES YES YES
Standard errors in parentheses
*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1
This table presents estimation results for equation (1) in the paper. Columns 1 and 2 contain the results of the stochastic frontier
model (semi-volatility) and the conditional heteroscedastic regression model (market-to-book value of equity). Column 3 contains
the results of the stochastic frontier model (semi-volatility) where the variance of the ine¢ ciency term is a function of bank-specic
characteristics (hence, we allow for scale heterogeneity). Column 4 contains the results of the conditional heteroscedastic regression
model, in which the volatility of the error terms is a function of bank characteristics. We estimate a costfunction for total risk.
That is, the ine¢ ciency score measures excess risk above the frontier, which is determined by the banks with minimum risk given
a set of bank characteristics. In particular, stochastic frontier analysis allows decomposing the error term in random noise and
a measure of risk ine¢ ciency. As rms (banks) can be both over- or undervalued with respect to their fundamentals, we employ
a standard OLS regression model (with both positive and negative residuals) rather than a stochastic frontier model which only
allows for one-sided deviations from the frontier. The variables are measured over the period 1991-2007 at a quarterly basis. Bank
balance sheets are observed and measured as stock values at a quarterly basis. Data from the income statement is reported on a
cumulative basis over the accounting year and are therefore rst transformed to quarterly increments. The independent variables
are lagged one quarter. The sample includes all US Bank Holding Companies that have publicly traded equity for at least four
consecutive quarters. Furthermore, we exclude banks of which the stock has zero trading volume for more than 20 percent of the
observations. The total sample consists of 17.264 observations on 899 bank holding companies. Time and bank xed e¤ects are
included in each column (but not reported). In the second column, the standard errors are robust and clustered at the bank level.
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